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Abstract  
This thesis analyses what factors explain the differences in how municipalities develop their 
counter-radicalisation policies. It has practical relevance since it can possibly improve the 
knowledge of policymakers on the development of these policies and help them improve 
these. Furthermore, this research hopes to contribute to filling a gap in the literature. The first 
assumption is that the model of integration of minorities affects the development of these 
policies. The second assumption is that political orientation affects the development of 
counter-radicalisation policies. Finally, the third assumption is that the local structure of civil 
society affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies. In order to examine this, 
the focus is on the municipality of Delft and the municipality of The Hague. This research 
confirms the last proposition and rejects the first and second propositions. Only the final 
factor, civil society, partly explains the different policies of the different municipalities. 
However, more research is needed on this subject to get a better image of all the factors that 
might affect the development of counter-radicalisation policies.  
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NCTV  National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism 
AIVD  General Intelligence and Security Services 
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PPN  Policy Planners Network on Countering Radicalisation and Polarisation 
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Introduction 
“Our way of life is under fire (Rutte, 2016).” This sentence was used by the Dutch prime 
minister after the attacks on Brussels in March 2016. Every time an attack takes place 
somewhere in Europe, it seems to shake up the Dutch society. Even though the Netherlands 
has never experienced an attack comparable to those in Madrid, London or Paris, terrorism 
and radicalisation are much debated subjects. The current threat level is substantial, level 4 
out of 5 (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2016). The sense of security has not improved over 
the last few months. “In December 2016, 78% of the Dutch population did not worry, or 
worried only a little, about their security as a result of an attack” (Ibid.). In June 2016 this was 
still 82% (Ibid.). Ever since the threat level went up in March 2013, the Dutch government 
has been working even more intensively on the approach of radicalisation and terrorism 
(Ministry of Security and Justice, 2014). When it comes to policy development surrounding 
counter-radicalisation, a lot of research still has to be done (Elshimi, 2015).  
 
In 2012, Delft was shocked by the fact that young people from a criminal network, living in 
their city, left for Syria. The municipality of Delft stated that radical ideas, street culture and 
youth criminality had gotten intertwined (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 8). In 2014, the 
government intensified its policies on radicalisation and as a result Delft received more 
money to improve their counter-radicalisation policies. The main goals they want to reach 
with these policies are prevention and increasing resilience, increasing awareness/knowledge 
on radicalisation processes, countering negative polarization, timely addressing social unrest 
and tensions and executing a personally oriented or group oriented approach at radicalisation 
and extremism (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 8). The municipality has established a 
strategic network, which includes for example social workers, volunteer organizations and 
police agents (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 6). They work together to achieve these goals 
(Ibid.). The focus of the municipality of Delft is on the community and the involvement of its 
citizens. They argue that the different communities and individuals make sure that the 
dialogue continues to exist; that Delft is a society where people meet each other and 
understand and respect each other (Municipality of Delft, 2015, p. 5).  
 
The Hague is a Dutch city that was confronted with radicalisation as well. The municipality of 
The Hague recognizes that radicalisation is a serious problem that needs to be addressed. Just 
as in Delft, radicalisation and criminality seem to have intertwined. Member of the municipal 
Master Thesis, Pepijn Knops, S1142143 
 4 
executive (wethouder) Ingrid van Engelshoven argued that “youngsters are mad at society 
because it does not offer them any future perspectives. So, they start looking for alternatives 
to be part of something: first criminality, now radicalisation” (Van Engelshoven, 2015). Over 
the last couple of years, more than 3500 professionals have participated in an orientation 
program in which they were informed about the backgrounds of Jihadism, the signs of 
radicalisation and what they can do when they recognize certain signals (Van Aartsen, 2016a, 
p. 3). In 2016, the city received nearly one million euro from the government to address 
radicalisation and jihadism. For a big part, this money was used/is being used to analyze the 
problems surrounding radicalisation (Fluit, 2016). More than half of the money (€550.000,-) 
was spent on extra capacity, extra hiring of knowledge and the strengthening of local partners 
(Van Aartsen, 2016b, p. 2). An amount of €350.000,- was spent on local networks and social 
resilience, which entailed extra coaching trajectories for vulnerable youngsters and trainings 
on radicalisation and identity (Ibid.). Former mayor of The Hague, Jozias van Aartsen, stated 
that “if we allow our society to be guided by distrust, fear and hate, we have lost that which 
we want to protect: a society with freedom of speech, freedom of religion and mutual respect” 
(Bertram and Van Aartsen, 2014, p. 2). 
 
It is interesting to examine the counter-radicalisation policies at the level of the municipality, 
since municipalities play an important role in preventing social tensions and radicalisation 
(NCTV, 2014, p. 7). Most of the literature has focused on the differences of the counter-
radicalisation policies between the different countries (Lindekilde 2012a, Lister and Otero-
Iglesias, 2012, Silke, 2005). Furthermore, there are intergovernmental networks, such as the 
European Policy Planners Networks Countering Radicalisation and Polarisation (PPN), that 
bring together policy planners from integration and security ministries to look at the good and 
bad practices in this policy area (PPN, 2010, p. 1). However, very little has been written on 
the development of counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal level. Therefore, it is 
interesting to examine these policies. Every country has its own unique cultural, political and 
legal elements, which contribute to how policies are shaped. However, even when cities are 
located in the same country, their policies differ sometimes. Some municipalities decide to 
take a tough approach, while others decide to take a softer approach. This thesis will focus on 
the factors that explain these differences. Thus, the research question is: What factors explain 
the differences in how municipalities develop their counter-radicalisation policies? 
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Literature review 
In many debates, radicalisation is defined as “a process of developing extremist ideologies 
and beliefs, and hence to some extent it is used to denote a major precursor to terrorism” 
(Dzhekova, Stoynova, Kojouharov, Mancheva, Anagnostou and Tsenkov, 2016, p. 8). 
However, this definition has been criticized since it is “neither based on empirical findings, 
nor does it help to better understand the mechanisms that lead to political violence and 
escalation” (Ibid.). According to Schmid (2013, p. 1), the concepts radicalisation and counter-
radicalisation are problematic since they “are poorly defined and mean different things to 
different people.” The municipality of Delft and the municipality of The Hague both use the 
same definition of radicalisation: “Radicalisation is the willingness to strive for, support or 
encourage far-reaching changes (possibly undemocratic changes) in society. Far-reaching 
changes are developments that can threaten the democratic order (goal) often with 
undemocratic means (means), that damage the functioning of the democratic order (effect)” 
(Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 5 & Municipality of The Hague, 2014, p. 7). This definition 
will be used in this thesis, since the focus is on these two municipalities.  
 
There has been an upsurge of academics interested in radicalisation from 2004 onwards, 
which can be seen in appendix 1 (Baker-Beall, Heath Kelly and Jarvis, 2015, p. 17).  
According to Baker-Beall et al. (2015, p. 16) “radicalisation analysts supply what policy-
makers demand.” After the murder of Theo van Gogh and the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and 
the attacks in London in 2005, policy makers had to devise counter-radicalisation policies to 
pre-empt such violence (Ibid.). Since then “several European countries have developed 
comprehensive counter-radicalisation strategies seeking to de-radicalize or disengage 
committed militants and, with even greater intensity, prevent the radicalisation of new ones” 
(Vidino and Brandon, 2012, p. 1). “Initially, there was confusion over the methodologies and 
terminologies used in counter-radicalisation programmes as these were developed separately 
in different countries and were subject to constant revision” (Rasheed, 2016, p. 40). Rasheed 
(2016, p. 41) states that “counter-radicalisation studies and programmes have extended the 
scope and impact of counterterrorism operations beyond conventional security and military 
paradigms by delving into ideological, religious, socio-political, economic and, at times, 
historical vectors.” “The central premise of most counter-radicalisation programmes is that 
terrorism spreads in societies because of the extremely divisive and violent propaganda and 
indoctrination carried out by various extremist institutions and terrorist organisations” (Ibid.).  
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Over the years, the policy field on the prevention of radicalisation has taken shape. According 
to Lindekilde (2012a, p. 335), this policy field “identifies radicalisation as a growing social 
and security problem to which governments must attend in a timely manner in order to 
prevent radicalisation processes from taking hold.” At the beginning, many looked at 
radicalisation as a linear process of increasing extremism, but more recent approaches of 
counter-radicalisation policies combine aspects of more classic security policies with 
elements of social cohesion programs, integration policies and community building (Ibid.). 
Some authors, such as Silke (2005) and Mueller (2005, p. 502), claim that counter-
radicalisation can be counterproductive and costly. On the contrary, Laiq and Hearne (2010, 
p. 11) argue that “deradicalisation programs have the potential to be of enormous benefit to 
governments worldwide.”  
 
Several authors have given attention to counter-radicalisation policies in practice (Lindekilde, 
2012a, Silke, 2005, Mythen, Walklate and Khan, 2009). While looking at different states, 
both differences and common traits can be found. Lindekilde (2012a, p. 337), for example, 
focused on Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands in his research. He noticed big differences 
in the initial policies of these states in terms of target groups, scope (local versus national) and 
the definition of ‘a radical’. However, he also noticed that they had similar thoughts on how 
radicalisation develops and what the vulnerable group is (Ibid.). Lister and Otero-Iglesias 
(2012) made a different comparison by looking at the United Kingdom and Spain. They sum 
up their findings as follows: In Spain, “terrorism is dealt with within the existing legal 
framework and combined with a lingering skepticism of security services and the legal system 
suggests that increasing anti-terrorism powers are less politically viable (or legally necessary). 
In contrast, the United Kingdom, owing to its penchant for temporary law to deal with 
terrorism, has produced a situation where Parliament has become habituated to legislating on 
terrorism matters. These policy paradigms, along with differing attachments to civil liberties, 
help to understand the different responses by these countries to a seemingly common 
pressure” (Lister and Otero-Iglesias, 2012, p. 564). These authors show that despite a 
seemingly common threat, states respond in different ways because of (among other factors) 
their different historical legacies, institutional considerations and legal frameworks.  
 
There are a lot of differences within countries that have left it to the local municipalities to 
choose their policies. So, there is also within country variation as opposed to only between 
country variation. However, in the current literature, not many authors focus on understanding 
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why it is that in the same country different cities would develop different policies. This makes 
it interesting to look at the development of counter-radicalisation policies at the municipal 
level and to examine what factors explain the differences in these policies. According to the 
European Urban Knowledge Network (EUKN, 2016, p. 5), “some municipalities are already 
well on their way in developing and implementing policies, while other municipalities have to 
make a start or are uncertain about the right direction.” Furthermore, they state that “mutual 
learning and exchange of experiences will help policy-makers and practitioners at various 
levels to get a better understanding of preventive approaches and measures” (Ibid.). 
 
Theoretical framework 
In social sciences, neoliberalism has become an important concept, which is “describing the 
structural changes in the global economy since the 1970s. At the most fundamental level, 
neoliberalism builds on the classical liberal notion implying the triumph of market forces and 
individual autonomy over state power” (Young, 2011, p. 1676). It can be understood as a 
theory that “proposes human well-being as best advanced through an institutional framework 
characterized by private property rights, free markets and free trade” (Heath-Kelly, Baker-
Beall and Jarvis, 2015, p. 2). However, neoliberalism has also changed the structure of the 
social relationships people have, such as relationships in the workplace, family, neighborhood 
and civil society (Kymlicka, 2012, 99).  
 
“Various critical literatures in International Relations have identified neoliberal economic 
trends as integral to counterterrorism frameworks and techniques” (Heath-Kelly et al., 2015, 
p. 1). According to Heath-Kelly et al. (2011, p. 2), “the deployment of risk through security, 
for example, identify the application of actuarial tools drawn from the market to issues of 
political violence, tracing their subsequent development into speculative tools of contingency 
management. Here, insecurity is tamed through its rendering as manageable, predictable risk 
precisely by the application of economic technologies to various fields of security.” 
According to Lindekilde (2012b, p. 110), “it is characteristic of the radicalisation discourse, 
and of the new policy regimes, that they mix a security agenda with an integration agenda, 
where security concerns and risk assessment become closely intertwined with questions of 
integration, anti-discrimination, and social cohesion.” Furthermore, the link between 
neoliberalism and counter-terrorism has also focused on the growing role of private 
organizations in the security sphere (Heath-Kelly et al., 2011, p. 2). Some countries have 
employed “neo-liberal governmentality approaches of governance through individual support 
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and response, information and knowledge, empowerment, surveillance and intervention, and 
anti-discrimination” (Lindekilde, 2012b, p. 110). The aim of these policies is to prevent 
radicalisation by shaping, disciplining and transforming illiberal and violent radicals into 
liberal, active citizens (Ibid.). Thus, neoliberalism could serve worthwhile in analysing the 
different policies of the municipalities.  
 
Shortly after the attacks in London in 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair put the focus on 
integration. In Britain, the assumption was made that inadequate integration resulted in 
terrorist attacks (Rahimi and Graumans, 2016, p. 33). As a result, the Preventing Extremism 
Together Project (PET) was established, which focused on several integration agenda items 
(Ibid.). After this, “many other Western nations followed suit and began to develop security 
strategies and counter-terrorism measures that similarly adopted a strong focus on integration, 
reflecting the underlying assumption of failed integration as the cause of violent 
radicalisation” (Rahima and Graumans, 2016, p. 33). Even though many Western states seem 
to agree that integration is an important aspect in countering radicalisation, their models of 
integration of minorities differ (Ibid.). 
 
Sedgwick examined three Scandinavian countries: Norway, Denmark and Sweden. According 
to him (2011), although these countries “have much in common socially, culturally and 
linguistically, they have diverged politically in recent years over issues connected with 
immigration and integration, and the divergence is reflected both in policies and in research 
on radicalisation.” He concludes that political differences matched differences in the 
development of counter-radicalisation policies (Ibid.). However, according to De Haas en 
Natter, political orientation does not necessarily have to guarantee an outcome in a certain 
direction (2015, p. 2). Factors such as political negotiation or the influence of lobbies can alter 
the preferences of a party (De Haas and Natter, 2015, p. 2). Still, it seems most likely that the 
political orientation of a government affects its policies.  
 
According to Van Ginkel (2012, p. 7), “it is clear that civil society organisations working in 
areas of development, women’s rights, conflict transformation, governance building, freedom 
of the internet, interfaith dialogue, human rights and providing other forms of dialogue 
platforms, all contribute in some way in addressing conditions conducive to the spread of 
terrorism.” These organisations act locally, “while still being connected with grassroots 
movements that give voice to the grievances in society” (Ibid.). Van Ginkel (2012, p. 1) states 
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that civil society can play a crucial role in countering and preventing radicalisation. “Policy at 
both national and EU levels has acknowledged the role of civil society in counter-
radicalisation and de-radicalisation” (Institute of Strategic Dialogue 2010, p. 4). This implies 
that the local structure of civil society, has an impact on what counter-radicalisation policies 
look like. The Institute of Strategic Dialogue (2010, p. 25) argues that “civil society is now an 
integral player in counter- and de-radicalisation, encompassing community organisations, 
frontline workers and the general public.”  
 
Propositions 
 
1) The model of integration of minorities affects the development of counter-radicalisation 
policies. 
 
2) Political orientation affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies.  
 
3) The local structure of civil society affects the development of counter-radicalisation 
policies. 
	
These propositions are based on the theories presented in the theoretical framework. In order 
to test these propositions, this thesis will look at the municipality of Delft and the 
municipality of The Hague. Both municipalities use networks to reach people and consider 
cooperation to be an important aspect. The Hague states that countering radicalisation and 
jihadism is an intensive job that requires a broad municipal approach. They have chosen to 
intensify the cooperation between the different municipal services (Municipality of The 
Hague, 2014, p. 5). The municipality of Delft acknowledges that in order to be successful, 
they are strongly dependent of the efforts of parties such as the police, the Public Prosecution 
Service (OM) and societal organizations (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 9). Despite the 
common traits, the counter-radicalisation approaches of these municipalities differ. In order to 
confirm or reject the propositions that might explain these differences, this thesis will first 
explain what is different and will then test the propositions.  
 
Object of study 
This thesis aimed to assess what factors explain the differences in how municipalities develop 
their counter-radicalisation policies. The focus is on two Dutch municipalities: Delft and The 
Hague. Delft is a municipality which has over 100.000 inhabitants and is one of the Dutch 
cities with the highest number of individuals travelling to Syria (Kouwenhoven, 2014). The 
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municipality of The Hague has more than 500.000 inhabitants and is the Dutch city with the 
highest number of individuals travelling to Syria (Kouwenhoven and Smithuijsen, 2016). 
Different policy documents, documents from the city council, articles and newspaper articles 
have been analysed. By doing so, this research provides an in-depth examination of the way 
counter-radicalisation policies are developed at the municipal level. 
 
Data generation and analysis 
In order to conduct a discourse analysis, different written works were gathered. These are 
documents from the city councils of Delft and The Hague, policy documents, newspaper 
articles and so forth. In order to analyse the generated data, a sociological discourse analysis 
was used (Ruiz, 2009). Ruiz (2009, p. 2) defines discourse as “any practice by which 
individuals imbue reality with meaning.” With the use of this discourse, three different levels 
of analysis will be discussed: a textual level, a contextual level and an interpretive level (Ruiz, 
2009, p. 4). In the textual analysis the structure and composition of the discourse was 
characterized or determined (Ruiz, 2009, p. 7). In order to proceed to the contextual level, and 
more specifically the situational discourse analysis, a comprehensive description was required 
of the context in which the discourse was produced. A situational analysis “goes beyond a 
mere description of discourse to provide an initial explanation at a micro-sociological level” 
(Ruiz, 2009, p. 11). In the final level, the interpretive level, the discourse needed to be 
interpreted. During this interpretation connections were made between “the discourses 
analysed and the social space in which they have emerged” (Ruiz, 2009, p. 15) 
 
The different approaches 
Over the years, the municipality of Delft and the municipality of The Hague have developed 
counter-radicalisation policies. These two cities face problems with radicalizing citizens but 
they both deal with this in different ways. The municipality of Delft uses a soft approach, 
while the municipality of The Hague uses a harder approach. According to Hoeft (2015, p. 1), 
“the distinguishing feature of soft approaches is that they are designed to win the hearts and 
minds of radicalizing individuals by employing non-coercive methods.” These approaches are 
aimed at preventing people from (fully) radicalizing and using violence. Pliner (2014, p. 9) 
argues that there is “a broad range of non-coercive instruments, such as messaging, capacity-
building, outreach to civil society, and educational campaigns.” He argues that they “are 
necessary to make environments non-permissive for terrorists seeking to exploit them.” 
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The distinction in this thesis between hard and soft approaches is made based on two factors. 
The first factor is the density of municipality relations with civil society. If such meetings take 
place regularly, it contributes to a soft approach. This is the case because the municipality is 
reaching out to civil society. If not, it contributes to a hard approach. The second factor is the 
willingness of the municipality to acknowledge and to foster citizen initiatives that address 
polarization and radicalisation. When this is a priority, this factor contributes to a soft 
approach. However, when this is not a priority, this factor contributes to a hard approach. 
 
The Hague states that countering radicalisation and jihadism is an intensive job that requires a 
broad municipal approach. They have chosen to intensify the cooperation between the 
different municipal services (Municipality of The Hague, 2014, p. 5). They are not in dialogue 
with other societal organizations on a regular basis (Ibid.), whereas Delft has a standard 
meeting on radicalisation/polarization with community organisations and citizens every 
month (Bruggen Bouwen Delft, 2017). The municipality of Delft argues that in order to be 
successful, they are strongly dependent of the efforts of parties such as the police, the OM and 
societal organizations (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 9). They actively try to engage with 
their community (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 8). So, while the municipality of The 
Hague is mostly focused on intensifying and solidifying the municipal services itself, the 
municipality of Delft has closer relations with their non-municipal services and is more 
actively trying to get its community to participate. 
 
The municipality of Delft highlights the importance of initiatives from societal organizations 
or citizens. They support and facilitate such initiatives and have made resources available to 
do so (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 8). For example, in 2016, they started a program to 
support initiatives of individuals to get out of crime and back on track. More than 24 cases 
were finished successfully and the goal is to support more than 50 initiatives every year 
(Municipality of Delft, 2017, p. 3). They clearly state that they also want the community to 
organize events aimed at the prevention of polarization and radicalisation (Municipality of 
Delft, 2015b, p. 8). The municipality of The Hague does not consider this to be a priority in 
their counter-radicalisation policies. They mention that they sometimes support initiatives 
from citizens or societal organizations, but they do not get further into this in their counter-
radicalisation policy (Municipality of The Hague, 2014). Overall, events aimed at the 
prevention of radicalisation and polarization in The Hague are initiatives from the 
municipality itself. 
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So, the relations between the municipality of The Hague and the societal organisations are not 
that strong and the municipality does not consider acknowledging and fostering initiatives to 
be a priority. Therefore, this thesis argues that the municipality of The Hague uses a hard 
approach when it comes to their counter-radicalisation policies. However, the municipality of 
Delft does have strong relations with their societal organisations and does consider 
acknowledging and fostering initiatives to be a priority. Thus, this thesis argues that the 
municipality of Delft uses a soft approach when it comes to their counter-radicalisation 
policies.  
 
Model of integration of minorities 
Integration is “the opposite of segregation, the bringing into equal membership of a common 
society those groups or persons previously discriminated against on racial or cultural 
grounds” (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 486). Rahimi and Graumans (2016, p. 33) state that when it 
comes to integration, “the lack of consensus regarding operational definition and 
measurement renders its usage and application, especially in national policies and strategies, 
problematic.” According to Kymlicka, the rise of multiculturalism and integration was 
experienced by citizens as a part of a neoliberal whole (2015, 7): “they were told to extend 
equality to minorities, but the meaning of equality was being reduced and reinterpreted in a 
neoliberal form, as essentially equal access to (or perhaps better, equal exposure to) the 
competitive global marketplace” (Kymlicka, 2015, p. 8) The discourse on radicalisation also 
concerns how liberal Western democracies integrate, and relate to minorities (Lindekilde, 
2012b, 110).  
 
The Netherlands has created a model of integration of minorities in order to establish an 
inclusive society. The government promotes social cohesion and social stability through 
participation and integration of everyone with a migrant background (Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment, 2017). Their aim is to create a social, stable society, which means 
that people can participate without barriers, people can live together in variety and that 
everyone feels at home despite of his or her origin, religion or beliefs (Ibid.). In order to 
accomplish this, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment stimulates (using among 
other things financial instruments) the self-reliance and participation in society of migrants 
(Ibid.). In the period 2000-2015, integration was a much debated subject in society and 
politics and as a result the course of the national integration policy has shifted a number of 
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times (Klaver, Odé, Smit and Witkamp, 2016, p. II). This was accompanied by fluctuations in 
the available amount of money: approximately €123 million in 2000, €582 million in 2010 
and €123 million in 2015 (Ibid.). The municipalities must give effect to the actual integration 
of migrants and accompany them through this process (VNG, 2016, p. 1).  
 
The four biggest non-Western migrant groups in the Netherlands are first and second 
generation migrants of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin (Dagevos and 
Huijnk, 2016, p. 7). In a report on integration by the Social and Cultural Plan bureau, it is 
stated that their discomfort about their life and their possibilities in the Netherlands is 
increasing (Dagevos and Huijnk, 2016, p. 24). The bureau states that on the one side the level 
of education of migrants is increasing and their education results and control of the Dutch 
language are improving but on the other side they still have a disadvantage on the labor 
market and an overrepresentation in criminality (Ibid.) On both the national and the local 
level, policies have been developed to address these problems.  
 
The models of integration of minorities of the municipality of Delft and the municipality of 
The Hague have small differences, but overall they are quite similar. Both want to include and 
connect their citizens and organizations, decrease discrimination and stimulate initiatives from 
citizens (Baldewsingh, 2015, p. 2 and Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 2). Another similarity is 
that both cities emphasize the importance of dialogue (Baldewsingh, 2015, p. 9 and 
Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 2), since they both have to deal with social unrest and/or 
tensions at times. Furthermore, in both cases, there are problems with the employment of 
migrants, who find it more difficult to find a job than non-migrants (Baldewsingh, 2015, p. 3 
and Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 3), which needs to be addressed. Their main goals are the 
same. 
 
The municipality of Delft wants to establish conditions in such a way that every citizen can 
chose his own course for his life (Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 2), which is in line with 
neoliberal thinking. Furthermore, they want to make migrants feel welcome (Municipality of 
Delft, 2014, p. 4). The increasing number of migrants (see appendix 2) is accompanied by 
certain challenges. According to the municipality, results show that youth criminality in 
several migrant groups is out of proportion (Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 3). The causes can 
mainly be found in the traditional authoritarian culture at home, which conflicts with the 
Netherlands, where (in the eyes of migrants) everything seems possible (Ibid.). The 
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municipality states that street culture, youth criminality and radical ideas have gotten 
intertwined in their city (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 8). This shows a link of the 
integration policies to the counter-radicalisation policies. One of the aspects of their 
integration policy is the addressing of youth criminality. Because of the decentralization of 
youth care, municipalities have quite some autonomy in deciding how they want to address 
certain issues (Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 3). They have increased their control over the 
local youth and wellbeing facilities, which creates opportunities to better incorporate migrant 
organizations in their local policy. The municipality argues that by working together with 
these organizations, migrants get to know the youth facilities better and learn to trust them 
(Ibid.). By better involving migrants, the municipality hopes to make them more resilient, 
which is an important element of their counter-radicalisation policies. Delft recognizes that 
radicalisation and people travelling to Syria are serious problems and that their community 
needs to be resilient to resist this (Municipality of Delft, 2014, p. 2).  
 
The municipality of The Hague more clearly states a link between their integration policies 
and their counter-radicalisation policies. According to them, the long-term solutions to 
prevent radicalisation and jihadism need to come from education, participation, emancipation 
and combatting unemployment (Bertram and Van Aartsen, 2014, p. 2), which are important 
aspects of their integration policy (Municipality of The Hague, 2017). Another aspect of their 
integration policy, that they expand on in their counter-radicalisation policy, is the 
involvement of different communities. A small number of initiatives from religious 
communities about distancing yourself from radicalisation are supported by the municipality 
(Bertram and Van Aartsen, 2014, p. 4). They consider their integration policy to be very 
important and therefore member of the municipal executive (wethouder) Rabin Baldewsingh 
(2015, p. 2) argues that “integration should be part of all the policy areas.” 
 
These cases show that the model of integration of minorities does not explain the differences 
in the development of counter-radicalisation policies. Both municipalities have similar models 
of integration of minorities, but this has not resulted in similar counter-radicalisation policies.  
 
Political orientation 
There is no universal definition of the term political orientation. The dictionary Merriam-
Webster (2017) defines orientation as “a usually general or lasting direction of thought, 
inclination or interest.” In this line, political orientation can be seen as an orientation that 
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characterizes the thinking of a certain nation, party or government. This is the definition of 
political orientation that will be used in this thesis. Sometimes assumptions are made because 
of the left- or right-orientation of a government. For example, it is often assumed that a right-
wing government is less pro-immigration than a left-wing government (De Haas and Natter, 
2015, p. 2). However, according to De Haas and Natter (2015, p. 2), “political negotiating, the 
influence of (particularly business and trade union) lobbies, as well as the international 
diffusion of policy trends may water down parties’ preferences and lead to much more fuzzy 
policy outcomes at the government level.” 
 
Since 2010, the Netherlands has had a Prime Minister (Mark Rutte) from the VVD, which 
stands for People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD, 2017). This party “believes that 
the government’s role is important, although not central, and it is not a goal in itself. In other 
words, the VVD wants everyone to have equal opportunities for development but, at the same 
time, it believes that those who earn more through hard work and those who develop their 
talents or take more responsibility upon themselves, should be better rewarded” (Ibid.). Under 
the leadership of the Prime Minister, the government has established three main goals when it 
comes to counter-radicalisation: protecting the democracy and the rule of law, fight and 
weaken the jihadist movement in the Netherlands and removing the grounds for radicalisation 
(Ministry of Security and Justice, 2014, p. 2).  
 
From 2004 until 2016, Delft had a mayor from the VVD. The VVD Delft believes that the 
local authorities should be less involved (VVD Delft, 2014, p. 1) and that security is a joint 
responsibility of citizens, companies and the municipality (VVD Delft, 2014, p. 28). A link 
can be made between the ideas of the VVD Delft and the counter-radicalisation policies of the 
city. The idea that security is a joint responsibility can also be found in the counter-
radicalisation policies of the municipality of Delft. The municipality is in control but also 
depends for an important part on other organizations such as the police, societal organizations 
and first line workers (Municipality of Delft, 2015b, p. 9). 
 
Since 2008, The Hague has a mayor from the VVD as well. The VVD The Hague wants The 
Hague to take the lead when it comes to the broad application of administrative measures in 
order to prevent radicalisation (VVD Den Haag, 2014, p. 2). They argue that municipalities 
should not hesitate to bring the rules into practice: revoke passports, refuse the new issuing of 
passports, stop social benefits (Ibid.). They state the following: “We must fight this hard. The 
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Hague is the international city of justice and peace. That should be carried out on the streets 
as well” (VVD Den Haag, 2014, p. 3). The municipality of The Hague has a similar view on 
how they will address the problems surrounding radicalisation. They state that “The Hague 
will act with force against those who are radicalizing or who set up groups against each other” 
(Municipality of The Hague, 2015b, p. 3). They have made multiple arrests and a number of 
people have been convicted. By using this tough approach, The Hague wants to set an 
example and discourage people from radicalizing (Kouwenhoven and Smithuijsen, 2016).  
 
These cases show that political orientation is not a factor that explains the differences in the 
development of counter-radicalisation policies. Both Delft and The Hague have the same 
political orientation (a mayor from the VVD), but the counter-radicalisation policies still 
differ.  
 
Civil society 
Civil society is defined as “the totality of voluntary civic and social organizations and 
institutions that form the basis of a functioning society as opposed to the structures of the state 
or the market” (Institute of Strategic Dialogue, 2010, p. 4). “Several states and multilateral 
organisations have recognized the important role that civil society actors can play in dealing 
with conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and thus in preventing and countering 
violent extremism” (Van Ginkel, 2012, p. 2). According to Van Ginkel (2012, p. 5), it makes 
a difference in counter-radicalisation policies what the local structure of civil society looks 
like (free, regulated, restricted). She claims it can be beneficial for states to cooperate with 
civil society and not restrict their activities (Ibid.). Furthermore, she (Van Ginkel, 2012, p. 10) 
states that, “policymakers within governments and international organisations would be well-
advised to actively engage with civil society organisations by inviting them to participate in 
the debate on the regional challenges and possible solutions in all aspects of preventing and 
countering violent extremism.” As discussed earlier, this seems to be happening more often in 
Delft than it does in The Hague. This could possibly be explained by the local structure of 
civil society. 
 
Delft has a very active and closely connected civil society. In 2010, the municipality had a 
meeting with several community organisations and they argued that they wanted to be more 
involved in the policies of the municipality (Hooijdonk, 2010, p. 3). As a result, the 
municipality stated that (in dialogue with these organisations) they wanted to work towards a 
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more dynamic system, with open minds for new and changing arrangements for cooperation 
(Hooijdonk, 2010, p. 4) Sometimes they want to do this with a central and leading role for the 
municipality and in other cases the municipality stays more on the background in a network of 
private and public organisations (Ibid.). This cooperation component is also present in their 
counter-radicalisation policies in which they explicitly state that they need to work together 
with their civil society (Municipality of Delft, 2014b, p. 2). The creation of these policies has 
resulted in regular meetings. In cooperation with Bruggen Bouwen Delft, they organize one 
meeting every month to talk about a topic which is related to radicalisation (Bruggen Bouwen 
Delft, 2017). Multiple citizens, community organisations and religious organisations attend 
these meetings (Ibid.). Furthermore, the municipality has intensified its meetings with the 
local police with who they meet twice a week (Municipality of Delft, 2017, p. 2). It is possible 
to organize their policies in such a way, because of the small size of the city and number of 
community organisations. 
 
The Hague has an active civil society as well, but their civil society seems to entail more 
organisations and is more fragmented. Whereas in Delft the different organisations seem to be 
closely connected to each other, this seems to be more difficult in The Hague. According to 
the municipality, the different (international) organisations, companies, expats and citizens 
need to get intertwined and the municipality wants to have a leading role in establishing this 
(City Council Municipality of The Hague, 2009, p. 2). The municipality is working towards a 
participation society and is trying to counter fragmentation (Klein, 2014, p. 1). However, they 
do not have meetings with community organisations on fixed moments like they do in Delft. 
They use close connections between individuals who occupy crucial positions when dialogue 
is needed (Municipality of The Hague, 2015, p. 8). Besides this, they do not organize 
meetings for citizens and community organisations on a regular base (Ibid.). Instead of 
working with organisations to counter radicalisation, the municipality of The Hague seems to 
be using community organisations to reach their goals. This way, the organisations receive an 
assignment of the municipality. This shows that the civil society in The Hague is regulated.  
 
These cases show that the local structure of civil society affects the development of counter-
radicalisation policies. The local structures of the civil societies of the municipality of Delft 
and the municipality of The Hague differ and these municipalities adjust their policies 
accordingly. So, the denser the relations between civil society and the municipality, the more 
the counter-radicalisation policy is likely to be preventative rather than purely coercive.  
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Conclusion  
Because of the murder of Theo van Gogh and multiple terrorist attacks in other European 
countries, the Netherlands felt the need to develop a counter-radicalisation policy. Currently 
the threat level is substantial and the sense of security among citizens could be better. The 
municipalities were given an important role in this matter and had the space to develop their 
own counter-radicalisation policies in line with the national policy. Both The Hague and Delft 
had/have problems with radicalizing youngsters and were shocked by citizens travelling to 
Syria. In order to deal with this, they both established their own counter-radicalisation 
policies. Whereas Delft developed a soft approach, The Hague developed a tougher approach. 
This thesis examined what factors explain the differences in these policies.  
 
Delft and The Hague both have their own models of integration of minorities. They want to 
include their citizens and connect them with multiple organizations and stimulate dialogue 
and initiatives among citizens. In both cases, elements of their model of integration can be 
found in their counter-radicalisation policies. Delft tries to include migrants, hoping that this 
will make them more resilient and thus keep them from radicalizing. The Hague puts the 
focus on participation, education and emancipation in their integration policy. According to 
them these are long-term solutions to prevent radicalisation. According to these 
municipalities, integration is an important aspect when it comes to preventing radicalisation. 
This aligns with the statement made by Rahimi and Graumans (2016, p. 33), that many see 
failed integration as the cause of violent radicalisation. However, even though these 
municipalities have similar models of integration of minorities, they do not have the same 
counter-radicalisation policies. As a result, this research rejects the first proposition, which 
states that the model of integration of minorities affects the development of counter-
radicalisation policies.  
 
The city of Delft and the city of The Hague both had a mayor from the VVD the last couple of 
years. The VVD Delft considers security to be a joint responsibility of citizens, companies 
and the municipality. This is also part of the counter-radicalisation policies of the 
municipality, which states that the municipality is in control but (societal) organizations, first 
line workers, etc. also play an important part. The VVD The Hague wants to fight 
radicalisation with force and in the counter-radicalisation policies of the municipality it is also 
stated that The Hague will act with force and they do not hesitate to make arrests. This is in 
line with the thinking of Sedgwick, who claims that political differences match differences in 
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the development of counter-radicalisation policies. This means that the same political 
orientation should lead to similar policies. However, even though these municipalities both 
have the same political orientation, their counter-radicalisation policies differ. As a result, this 
research rejects the second proposition, which states that political orientation affects the 
development of counter-radicalisation policies.  
 
Delft and The Hague both have their own local structure of civil society. Delft is a small city 
with a number of community organisations that can be dealt with in a free manner. Therefore, 
Delft works closely together with these organisations when it comes to their counter-
radicalisation policies. The municipality of Delft does not always have to take the lead in 
these cases. The Hague is a city that entails more community organisations. This municipality 
always wants to be in control and overall they seem to be using the community organisations 
more than they are working with them to carry out their counter-radicalisation policies. This 
aligns with the statement made by Van Ginkel that policymakers acknowledge the role civil 
society plays in counter-radicalisation policies. As a result, this research does confirm the last 
proposition, which states that the local structure of civil society affects the development of 
counter-radicalisation policies. The denser the relations between civil society and the 
municipality, the more the counter-radicalisation policies are likely to be preventative rather 
than purely coercive. 
 
Thus, this research partly answers the question: “What factors explain the differences in how 
municipalities develop their counter-radicalisation policies?” The local structure of civil 
society is a factor that affects the development of counter-radicalisation policies and partly 
explains the differences between these policies. However, the model of integration of 
minorities and political orientation do not seem to play a role in the development of counter-
radicalisation policies. Therefore, in order to get a better view on the differences between 
these policies, more research needs to be done. In future research, it would be useful if more 
factors and more municipalities were included. (Counter-) radicalisation is a difficult field to 
study but also a very interesting one which still entails many opportunities.  
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